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Malware is a foundational component of cyber crime that enables an attacker
to modify the normal operation of a computer or access sensitive, digital informa-
tion. Despite the extensive research performed to identify such programs, existing
schemes fail to detect evasive malware, an increasingly popular class of malware
that can alter its behavior at run-time, making it difficult to detect using today’s
state of the art malware analysis systems. In this thesis, we present DVasion, a com-
prehensive strategy that exposes such evasive behavior through a multi-execution
technique. DVasion successfully detects behavior that would have been missed by
traditional, single-execution approaches, while addressing the limitations of previ-
ously proposed multi-execution systems. We demonstrate the accuracy of our system
through strong parallels with existing work on evasive malware, as well as uncover
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Malicious software, commonly known as malware, poses a significant threat
to computing resources worldwide as demonstrated by daily attacks against banks,
corporations, newspapers, and government agencies. Gen. Keith Alexander, the
former director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and former head of the U.S.
Cyber Command, cited that U.S. companies lose 114 billion USD annually due to
cyber crime [1]; President Obama has stated that “the cyber threat to our nation
is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face." [2].
Malware plays a significant role in the execution of such cyber attacks and it must
be comprehensively addressed.
Current state-of-the-art enterprise-level malware detection systems are founded
on sandbox-based detection, which utilizes isolated environments called sandboxes
to run suspected malware samples without allowing it to harm the actual host
computer [3, 4]. Sandboxes are primarily built through emulation or virtualization
technology and use a behavior detector that can monitor the program under test to
detect suspicious actions, such as sniffing keystrokes, writing to the registry, open-
ing a confidential file, or communicating with a suspicious IP address. An internet
simulator may be combined with this to trick malware into believing that it has the
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ability to communicate over the Internet, allowing relevant network code to execute
that otherwise would have been missed [5].
Despite the research and the industry built around the detection of malicious
programs, a largely unaddressed class of malware has emerged leaving many ex-
isting sandbox-based detection systems unable to identify the existence of these
programs. This malware, known as evasive malware, exploits the fact that sand-
boxes are typically emulated or virtualized environments whose presence may be
detectable, malware analysis solutions can only evaluate a sample for a few minutes
before moving on to other samples, or the realization that malicious activity could
only be performed while running on a targeted system. These malware instances
are able to successfully ensure that any malicious code is not executed during its
evaluation inside a malware analysis environment, thereby avoiding detection. Eva-
sive malware may employ a variety of strategies to achieve this behavior [6], with
common tactics including:
• Waiting for a few minutes to elapse using the system’s time or sleep command.
• Waiting for a few minutes to elapse using a look up of time from the Internet;
for example, a newspaper’s website can likely provide this information.
• Computing useless work for a few minutes before reaching the harmful code.
• Checking for the presence of a sandbox, and not executing harmful code in
that case.
• Checking for the presence of human interaction (e.g. mouse movement, key-
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board usage), which is usually not found in sandboxed environments.
• Checking for network addresses (e.g. IP address), usernames, files, or system
features, and conditionally running the malicious code based on what was
found.
According to a recent Lastline report, over 30% of modern malware contain
evasive features [7]. Despite its prevalence, existing malware detection schemes are
largely unable to successfully identify programs that have this behavior through
anti-detection counter measures employed by malware authors, which include code-
obfuscation, self-modifying code, and general evasive techniques. A solution that is
able to detect this malware in the presence of these qualities is required.
In this paper, we present DVasion (Detect Evasion), a comprehensive solution
for addressing all forms of evasive malware. This system exploits the fact that evasive
behavior is able to hide through the prevention of malicious code from being executed
in a sandboxed environment. DVasion responds to this tactic through a multi-
execution approach that forces the execution of these code portions without being
prohibitively expensive, primarily because we elect to not maintain program state
when evaluating alternate program paths. Our solution utilizes a dynamic binary
instrumentation framework to achieve this functionality, as well as an open-source




When considering the evasive malware samples that can be exposed through
DVasion, the following threat model enumerates the assumptions made by our sys-
tem. It is important to clarify that these assumptions are based upon the current
implementation limitations of DVasion, and not limitations in DVasion’s theory.
Chapter 6 explores how these assumptions can be better addressed through future
work.
1. The attacker does not try to crash DVasion.
2. Evasive code is hidden by direct branches.
3. Direct, evasive branches are not generated at random locations.
1.2 Contributions
Our work is novel through the depth of results presented and the improved
multi-execution approach used to detect evasive malware. Specifically, this paper
includes the following enumerated contributions:
1. The exposure of evasive malware utilizing dynamic binary instrumentation, an
existing sandbox-based behavior detector, and a multiple-execution approach
through DVasion.
2. The development and implementation of a comprehensive solution that is not
limited to a specific variant of evasive malware.
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3. Results that indicate that the maintenance of program state is not critical for
discovering evasive behavior.
4. The usage of static and dynamic optimizations that refine the multiple-execution
approach and allow for a satisfactory run-time.
1.3 Outline
In Chapter 2, an extensive overview of malware detection solutions, with a
focus on evasive malware strategies, is presented. In Chapter 3, the structure of
evasive code within malware is exposed and fundamental concepts that are utilized
in DVasion are discussed. In Chapter 4, the architecture and implementation details
of DVasion are examined, with experimental results on an extensive set of malware
samples provided in Chapter 5. In Section 6, our envisioned future work is detailed,
and Chapter 7 completes the work with our conclusions made.
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Chapter 2: Related Work
DVasion seeks to establish itself as an effective solution for the detection of
evasive malware behavior. This section specifically elaborates on the related work
performed in this field of study, allowing for the identification of the strategies
and limitations within previous proposals to defend against evasive malware. First,
traditional static and dynamic malware detection schemes are discussed, followed
by more advanced systems that address sandbox transparency and specific variants
of evasive malware. Finally, it addresses the related work that is most similar to
DVasion, which perform multiple executions to obtain a greater vision of the true
behavior of the analyzed binaries.
2.1 Traditional Malware Detection Schemes
2.1.1 Static Analysis
Much of the early malware detection schemes employed static analysis tech-
niques, which involves inspecting program binaries without running them to recog-
nize if they are malicious or not. This category includes the well-known signature-
based detection scheme [8], which compares unknown binary contents to a database
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of known malicious samples for a match.
SAFE [9] addresses some of the code obfuscation techniques that thwart static
analysis solutions, including complex control flow changes and register reassign-
ments. Their system involves the use of abstracting the code of known malicious
patterns and the executable under test, which allows for a direct comparison be-
tween the two to identify if any known malicious behavior exists in the binary.
In [10], a similar system was developed using the semantics of instructions to detect
the malicious behavior within binaries. The work in [11] also involved the use of
abstraction to detect the presence of a rootkit at load time, even in the presence of
minor changes to the binary image.
These systems are fundamentally limited in a variety of ways, including the use
of advanced code obfuscation techniques and self-modifying code. Through these
limitations, the code that is analyzed statically may not be the code that is executed,
leading to missed, potentially malicious, behavior.
2.1.2 Dynamic Analysis
Seeking to overcome the limitations of static analysis schemes, dynamic analy-
sis involves the execution of a binary and observing its run-time properties to identify
malicious samples; such behavioral information may be captured within a sandbox,
the protected, isolated run-time environment discussed previously, which can relay
the observed behaviors to the host system and indicate if the binary is safe to run
without such protections in place. Such environments include CWSandbox [12],
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TTAnalyze [13], and Cobra [14], which yield a diverse set of details about the ex-
ecutable gathered at run-time including created processes, Windows API functions
called (along with the arguments used for each), and any opened network connec-
tions.
Siren [15] extends the abilities of the virtualized environment used for testing
by allowing activity to be injected into the system that will generate a known series
of network requests. This strategy seeks to identify malicious binaries that involve
the transmission of information over the Internet, as such traffic will be discovered
after removing what corresponds to the previously injected activity. Panorama [16]
observes the correspondence between information access and processing behaviors,
a known quality of privacy-breeching malware. Through dynamic taint analysis,
explored in Section 4.1.2, it is able to formulate applicable data relationships that
may indicate the presence of this variant of malware.
Ultimately, these systems are limited through the observation of a single exe-
cution of a program that may not provide a complete analysis of the binary through
the use of evasive code techniques. A solution that is fully functional in the pres-
ence of evasive behavior, along with code obfuscation and self-modifying code, is a
necessity.
2.2 Transparent Malware Analysis
Research has actively explored the development of systems that are able to de-
tect evasive malware by making themselves transparent to the malicious executable,
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the hypothesis being that if the system goes undetected, any evasive, malicious code
will execute.
Ether [17] utilizes hardware virtualization extensions (e.g. Intel VT) to make
itself transparent, which removes the requirement of in-guest software components
that are vulnerable to detection. Despite its efforts, self-cited flaws in Intel’s VT
have left the system vulnerable to detection. While our proposed technique may be
detected as well, dynamic binary instrumentation can force the associated condition
checks to evaluate differently. Lastline [18] has taken a different approach through
full system emulation, which allows for an actual operating system to run on top of
an emulator. Emulation makes it difficult to detect the analysis system, but these
systems can be affected by the semantic gap between the observed CPU instructions
and higher-level concepts like files, processes, and network traffic. DVasion does
not have this difficulty, as it utilizes an injectable DLL to obtain this higher-level
view. Concerns over host-level detection inspired a disk-level malware detection
strategy [19] that is placed in the disk drive. This system utilizes the sequence of
disk requests made by a program to detect malware.
Fundamentally these systems are incomplete evasive malware solutions, as they
requires the evasive, hidden behavior to execute when their virtualized, emulated,
or hidden detection systems are not discovered; in this case, the malicious actions
performed would caused the malware be successfully detected. It very well may be
the case that malware employs both anti-virtualization/anti-emulation and addi-
tional environmental checks, which may cause this behavior to remain hidden given
the current date or the host machine’s IP address. As indicated by the previous
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examples, it is not easy to obtain a transparent system.
2.3 Addressing Specific Evasion Strategies
Some systems have been strategically built to address specific classes of evasion
strategies. The detectability of static honeytokens and how randomized honeytoken
generation is more effective in tricking spyware has been demonstrated in [20], while
[21] focuses on detecting malware timebombs that involve the invocation of malicious
code at some defined time in the future. The work in [22] addresses execution-
stalling malicious code that delays analysis systems to such a degree that the binary’s
malicious code is not reached, leveraging the fact that a binary can only be inspected
for a finite amount of time in the sandbox environment. The critical weakness of
these systems is that they are geared toward a specific evasive technique and not
a general approach. Furthermore, these systems are not perfect within their own
realm. For example, the integration of a cryptocounter within a malware instance
can prevent [21] from observing the value a malware is counting down to. Our
proposed system is designed to comprehensively tackle evasive malware without any
limitations imposed by the type of evasions performed.
2.4 Multiple Analyses
Recently, a new generation of evasive malware detection systems has emerged
involving the execution of the binary multiple times, each with different run-time
constraints or settings. These systems seek to obtain a more complete understanding
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of a binary by reaching new code that would not have been executed in a traditional
single-execution system due to hidden, malicious behavior; these systems are most
similar to ours.
2.4.1 Multiple Environments, Single Execution
By embracing the idea of running a program multiple times across different
environments, the work from Balzarotti el al. [23] and BareCloud [24] compares the
observed behaviors on an array of different systems, including a bare-metal reference
system similar in nature to prior work [25,26], with the assumption that deviations
in behavior are evidence that the program tried to evade a portion of the analysis
systems. In addition, MalGene [27] furthers this work through its automation of
evasion signature extraction from the obtained results, which can be used to quickly
interpret the evasions present. The primary flaw of such systems is that the program
under test can still evade all analysis systems through the incorporation of elements
like stalling code. When this occurs, there will be no observed deviation of dynamic
program behavior and the evasive malware would be incorrectly classified as benign.
DVasion is not affected by these weaknesses through a combination of multiple
executions and binary rewriting.
2.4.2 Multiple Executions, Single Environment
Two bug-finding tools, Dart [28] and EXE [29], utilize multiple-execution anal-
ysis to identify input cases that cause program crashes. These systems are differ-
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entiated from the proposed work as they require the source code of the binary and
seek to find program bugs. Given that malware is always in an executable form, we
will never have access to the original source code.
Moser et al. [30] and Brumley et al. [31] have both proposed systems similar
to DVasion, which allow for the execution of multiple code paths within a program
in order to find evasive behavior, the key difference being that these systems elect
to maintain state in the presence of modifying a binary’s control flow. Both of
these papers contain limitations that prevent them from a reasonable application to
modern malware. Through maintaining program state, these systems require that
they are able to modify the contents of the program’s register values or address space
to correspond with an alternate branch outcome or else the corresponding additional
program path will not be executed. Despite improvements made in the latter work,
this strategy is not perfect and a malware author could utilize complicated data
relationships to hide their evasive branch from future inspection. In this situation,
DVasion can still force the program execution in a different direction, as it is not
reliant on the ability to maintain program state. Furthermore, the design decisions
made in the first paper prevent the system from being applied to multi-threaded
applications, as well as those that use signals. The second paper is burdened from
a high run-time overhead, with analyses running shy of 30 minutes. DVasion is not
affected by these incompatibilities and significantly high overheads as it does not
maintain state, allowing it to be freely applied to programs with an overhead that
supports a high thoroughput of analyses.
Limbo [32] recognizes the slowdown applied by strictly maintaining program
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state, but it was only designed to detect kernel rootkits. Furthermore, the system
restores only the state of the CPU and stack when back-tracing to a previous basic
block for further exploration, which fails to undo all previous actions including
the creation of a file on the file system. DVasion may be applied to any malware
and utilizes clean virtual machine snapshots to ensure that there is no external
side-effects to cause a program to act a different way in the additional executions
performed.
2.4.3 Additional Work
While no results accompany these related works, we found it important to
identify two patent submissions utilizing multiple executions to obtain a greater
understanding of a program, with the second patent focused on detecting evasive
malware [33,34].
2.5 Summary
Despite the continual and detailed research performed to develop a system that
can address the rising class of evasive malware, there has yet to be a fully robust
solution proposed that can tackle this issue. Furthermore, the results within the
related work involving evasive malware indicate a striking trend: the discovery of
new, potentially evasive behavior has never been automatically reported on a large
dataset. Previous work [30] has utilized single, fine-grained case study examples to
demonstrate new behaviors found; with larger datasets, this work has cited code
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coverage metrics to assess their ability to explore a binary further. We strongly
believe that code coverage is an inadequate metric to measure our system’s effec-
tiveness, as it does not firmly conclude whether or not hidden, evasive behavior was
found within the tested programs. To the best of our knowledge, through DVasion’s
automatic reporting of new behavior that directly corresponds to a modified execu-
tion, we are the first paper to present such conclusive results of new behavior within
a large, general malware dataset.
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Chapter 3: Exploiting Evasive Malware
DVasion is a multiple-execution analysis solution that yields a more complete
picture of a binary through the execution of many alternate program paths. Go-
ing beyond similar multiple-execution proposals made to address evasive malware,
DVasion does not share some of the key limitations identified in Section 2.4. Fur-
thermore, our proposed system includes a component that automatically detects
a diverse range of new, potentially malicious behaviors that are discovered and di-
rectly correspond to one of the newly explored paths. This section first discusses the
structure of evasive malware, which leads to the enumeration of a requirement list
for a system that may exploit this code to yield any hidden behavior. Through this,
three key system components utilized by DVasion are discussed: dynamic binary
instrumentation, dynamic behavior detection, and sandbox-based testing.
3.1 Structure of Evasive Malware
The ultimate goal of evasive malware is to avoid detection within an analysis
environment, while maintaining the ability to perform its malicious actions on a
legitimate user’s machine. As discussed previously, evasive malware may employ a
variety of tactics, including checking for the presence of a sandbox or computing
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useless work at the beginning of the program’s execution.
Irrespective of the evasive strategy employed by the malware, evasion can
be accurately visualized at their fundamental unit: an assembly branch instruc-
tion. The branch instruction empowers a program to follow one of potentially many
paths based on the evaluation of a condition. With DVasion, we focus our analysis
specifically on direct branches, which result in a program’s control flow to travel to
either the branch’s target or fallthrough address, which are the addresses specified
in the instruction or is the next instruction after the branch, respectively. With two
possible execution paths, direct branches are a natural way to represent an evasive
condition check that must be satisfied before a malware’s malicious behavior is exe-
cuted. Chapter 6 reflects on indirect branches, which may allow for more than two
possible execution paths, and how they will be incorporated within our future work.
To best visualize a direct branch, consider the code snippet below that checks
the number of processor cores that are on the host system. This can be a successful
tactic in detecting that it is within a virtualized or emulated malware analysis sand-
box as these systems are commonly allocated a single core and a small amount of
RAM so that many instances of these environments can exist on the same machine,
which allows for the simultaneous evaluation of different unknown binaries. The
fact that these hardware allocations differentiate significantly from today’s com-
monplace multi-core computers that include multiple gigabytes of memory makes
this an effective evasion strategy.
1: mov eax, dword ptr fs:[0x30]
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2: test ebx, ebx
3: mov dword ptr [esp+0xc], eax
4: pop eax
5: mov eax, dword ptr [esp+0x8]
6: cmp dword ptr [eax+0x64], 0x2
7: jb 0x403923
8: call 0x4037e0
This code has been extracted from an instance of Dyre, further discussed in
Section 5.1.1, which involves a direct branch that is used to hide the majority of its
functionality. In Line 1, the malware obtains the pointer to the Process Environment
Block (PEB), which is located at an offset from the Thread Information Block
(TIB); both of these are Windows data structures that contain information about
the current process or thread. This value is placed on the stack on Line 3, which
is ultimately placed back in eax in Line 5. Line 6 is the evasive check within this
code snippet, as it results in a comparison of the value 0x2 and the contents at an
offset of the pointer to the PEB, which happens to store the number of cores present
in the system. Through this, Dyre is able to hide its evasive behavior behind the
fallthrough address, given that single-core test environments will cause Line 6 to
evaluate to be true and the next instruction executed will be at the branch’s target
address.
Throughout the remainder of this paper, such target or fallthrough addresses
that will yield a new segment of code that has not been previously executed will be
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referred to as potential Evasive Entry Points, or EEPs. It is clear that the identifi-
cation of these code segment entry points is critical to finding new paths within a
program to explore. In turn, the discovery of new behavior must be accounted for
while these paths are explored.
3.2 Proposed System Requirements
As it has been illustrated in the prior analysis of the Dyre code segment, a
multi-component system to address evasive malware is required to be successful;
ultimately, such a system may be considered in three key parts:
1. EEP discovery and evaluation. The identification of EEPs and the ability
to force a program’s execution to follow the corresponding alternate path.
2. Behavior detection. The detection of new, potentially malicious, behavior
that can be directly correlated to the execution of a branch’s alternate path.
3. Isolated environment. The use of an isolated, protected environment to
evaluate any suspected malware instances so that no modifications are made
to the underlying host system.
The first of these fundamentals may be realized through dynamic binary in-
strumentation, while the second is provided by monitoring the binary at run-time.
The third component may be safely achieved using traditional emulated or virtual-
ized sandbox environments. Each of these are explored in the following subsections,
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which allows for an easy segue towards the development and understanding of DVa-
sion’s architecture.
3.2.1 Dynamic Binary Instrumentation
We require the ability to discover EEPs and modify a program’s execution
path to follow the alternate outcome of a branch when desired, each of which can be
achieved through dynamic binary instrumentation, or DBI. Primarily used to mon-
itor a program’s execution, DBI frameworks can allow for the observation of events
at the instruction level and the modification of a binary’s run-time state while ex-
ecuting. At the instruction level, DBI code may be tuned to detect instructions
of a certain opcode, which is essential to discovering EEPs that may correspond
to branch instructions. Run-time state modifications can include modifying the
thread’s register values, including the instruction pointer register eip when con-
sidering the x86 architecture; the ability to modify this register can allow for the
direction of a program’s control flow to be altered, as this register corresponds to the
thread’s current instruction. DBI frameworks are especially helpful as they do not
require the program’s source code to run, unlike some previous work cited in Chapter
2. A variety of DBI systems exist, including Intel Pin [35] and DynamoRIO [36].
3.2.2 Dynamic Behavior Detection
We also require the ability to identify new behavior indicative of malicious
activity that corresponds directly to an alternate branch outcome. Relaxing this
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requirement slightly, we first require the ability to detect the dynamic behavior of
the binary in any part of its execution.
Following many of the strategies employed by the dynamic analysis systems
discussed in Section 2.1.2, this requirement may be satisfied by utilizing a tool that
observes a variety of run-time actions a program can perform. Together, these
actions may yield the identification of significant, potentially malicious, behavior.
It is important that the DVasion component capturing this dynamic behavior covers
a diverse amount of sources, which may contain, but is not limited to:
• Windows API calls made
• Modified Windows registry keys
• Files created, accessed, or modified
• Network traffic
• Processes created
• Dynamically generated or modified code
Information from any of the above input sources may be independently evalu-
ated or combined to yield signatures that indicate the presence of a certain activity
or program quality; for example, a keylogger can be captured through observing a
call to the SetWindowsHookEx function when used with a select grouping of function




Lastly, we require an isolated, protected environment to run potential malware
samples in, which may use emulation or virtualization technology to avoid allowing
the programs to modify the host system.
The ability to capture snapshots, or saved states within a sandbox at a moment
in time, and revert to them in an effective manner is an absolute must, as we
will use this to undo any changes a program is able to make within its sandbox.
Without this restore, programs’ side-effects will persist across the evaluation of
multiple samples, which can build up and affect how additional binaries behave.
Previous work in Section 2.4.2 did not perform this complete restore as they simply
modify the process’s state to evaluate a different code path; this incomplete restore
can be problematic with interactions that create external side effects, including the
use of files and network activity.
Given that the sandbox will be reverted to a previous, clean snapshot before
the execution of different code paths, these evaluations may be thought of as indi-
vidual tasks that are independent of one another. This realization can be exploited
by running these tasks in parallel, given the availability of multiple sandboxes to be
used for testing. Therefore, the sandbox of choice must effectively support running
multiple instances of it simultaneously.
Many emulated and virtualized environments can provide a sandbox environ-
ment that is suitable for protecting the host system, including Kernel-based Virtual
Machine (KVM) and VirtualBox.
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Chapter 4: System Design
To satisfy the system requirements that were established in Section 3.2, DVa-
sion’s architecture incorporates a virtual machine and host machine component,
where each plays a key role in the functionality of the proposed system. The virtual
machine component is responsible for the instrumentation of the unknown binary,
which includes logging the code that has been executed, gathering evasive entry
points to be further evaluated, and performing modifications to the executable’s
run-time state to allow for these paths to be explored. The host component acts
as the supervisor to an array of sandbox environments, each of which contain the
virtual machine component and have been instructed to perform a certain task; such
tasks include the exploration for evasive entry points or to forcibly cause a program’s
execution to follow a certain path. Both of these components are described within
this section and may be visualized in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 for the virtual machine
and host component, respectively.
4.1 Virtual Machine Component
The virtual machine component is responsible for performing several tasks,
which have been enumerated below; we seek to utilize dynamic binary instrumenta-
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Figure 4.1: An overview of DVasion’s virtual machine component.
Figure 4.2: An overview of DVasion’s host component.
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tion to achieve these functions, so this establishes a requirement list that our choice
of DBI framework must satisfy.
1. Branch discovery. The dynamic discovery of direct branches whose alternate
path (i.e. fallthrough or target address) has yet to be explored.
2. Visited instructions. The logging of where the program’s execution has
traveled.
3. Run-time state modification. The manipulation of the program’s run-
time state, specifically the stored instruction pointer, to effectively change the
program’s execution path at a given instant.
4.1.1 Intel Pin
Our proposed solution uses Pin [35], a DBI framework developed by Intel that
uses just-in-time (JIT) recompilation to instrument a program at run-time. While
Pin is closed-source, it provides a rich API that may be used to instrument a binary;
such programs are called pintools and are written in C/C++, which are compiled
as DLLs that accompany the execution of the Pin executable. Pintools primarily
consist of two types of routines that are provided to Pin via its API for instrumen-
tation, called instrumentation and analysis routines. Instrumentation routines are
called once when code is about to execute for the first time, and are accompanied
with static information like instruction opcodes and direct memory addresses. As
mentioned before, these functions have the ability to insert analysis routines that
may be associated with certain code from the original binary, and they are called
24
every time this original code is executed as well. Given the availability of both
through the DBI framework, it is clear that any function that requires statically
observed information of a program binary can utilize instrumentation routines; ad-
ditional information that requires the instruction to be evaluated at run-time, like
an indirect memory address, may use analysis routines.
As with any use of DBI, the run-time overhead of such analyses must be care-
fully controlled given that inefficiencies can cause havoc through high instrumenta-
tion overheads. Pin runs at a base overhead of 1.17x [37], which is further increased
through the use of instrumentation and analysis routines. Several strategies may be
employed to reduce this overhead, many of which involve analysis routines. These
functions are dynamically called with respect to the program’s execution. There-
fore, it is important that such functions are either reduced in complexity, size, or the
frequency that they are called. If any analysis computations can be performed stat-
ically, these should be placed in the corresponding instrumentation routines. This
simplification of analysis routines aids Pin in its effective optimization to inline these
function during the recompilation process.
Through Pin, we are able to observe which instructions a binary has executed
through instrumenting it; specifically, we monitor the execution of instructions at the
basic block level, as this reduces the overhead introduced by the pintool compared to
instrumented on a per-instruction basis while preserving a strong accuracy with what
code executed. With Pin, basic blocks are single-entrance, single-exit sequences of
instructions, which allows us to make the assumption that if any instruction from
the basic block executes, the rest of them will as well. Given concerns about code
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obfuscation which may render this assumption to be false, this optimization may
be easily rolled back to observing the executed code at the instruction level. In
addition, we are able to observe all aspects of any detected direct branch. Statically,
within instrumentation routines, direct branches can be identified along with their
fallthrough and target addresses, the latter of which must be specified directly. The
remainder of target addresses are only known dynamically, along with whether or not
the instruction actually executed or not, which requires the use of analysis routines.
Beyond monitoring the execution of a binary, Pin allows for the modification
of the program’s context, which includes the register values currently stored in the
processor. This ability provides the opportunity to change the eip register, and in
turn the direction at which the code is executed. Given the task of forcibly changing
a program’s execution to explore an EEP, the virtual machine component uses Pin
to first detect the presence of the branch that corresponds to the given EEP. At this
time, the program’s context may be modified to force either the target or fallthrough
address to be the next instruction evaluated, which effectively explores the code at
the EEP.
4.1.2 Dynamic Taint
Prior work [30] has considered the phenomenon known as path explosion, where
there might be too many code entry points to practically evaluate within a multi-
execution approach. Similar to this work, we utilize dynamic taint tracking as a
method to reduce the number of entry points considered when their total count is too
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high. Through taint analysis, if a data flow connection exists between a taint source
and a branch, there is a high probability that this branch is correlated to the source.
In this case, taint sources are Windows API functions that can allow evasive malware
to hide their behavior; example functions include GetUserName, GetCursorPos, and
PathFileExists. A connection between the use of such functions and the program
branches can be established through first identifying the instructions that set the
flags that are used when a branch’s condition is evaluated; such x86 instructions are
commonly test or cmp. Given these instructions, their operands may be checked
to see if they correspond to a tainted value. If this were to be the case, any use of
the flags set by the instruction by a branch will cause it to be tainted, and hence a
potential candidate for evaluating at a higher priority compared to other branches.
With regards to DVasion’s implementation, a simple heuristic is used given that
branches that correspond to a test or cmp instruction are typically executed next,
which allows for an easy association of these comparison instructions to branches.
To achieve this, we have utilized an instruction-level data tracking system built
on top of Pin called libdft [37]. Built for Linux and x86, it utilizes the knowledge
of its system calls and x86 instructions to either propagate or create tainted data.
The use of this system comes at a cost, as the average overhead is 3.65x; it is clear
that this can be a powerful tool if used in a limited fashion given the overhead.
Modifying libdft to work on Windows requires a fundamental understanding
on how the system works to tweak it in the right manner. This system essentially
consists of two components: taint propagation through x86 instructions, and taint
creation through system calls. Given that DVasion runs on x86, only minor mod-
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ifications were made to this component to allow for it to compile on Windows;
furthermore, these edits have allowed for a more up-to-date version of Pin to be
used with libdft, which matches the version used to create DVasion’s virtual ma-
chine component. The second component is where the majority of the modifications
were made. Clearly, we cannot use the Linux system call table on Windows, and
an equivalent table is not officially available through Microsoft. In place of this, we
have instead written wrapper functions for 79 Windows API functions that could
be used by evasive malware; these identified functions could be used for gathering
information about the host computer or connected networks, checking for file or
process existence, and checking the current time. Through these wrapper functions,
we were able to successfully taint any relevant function arguments or returned value.
To the best of our knowledge, we believe we have developed the first functional port
of libdft from Linux to Windows.
4.2 Host Machine Component
The host machine component is responsible for orchestrating the execution
of DVasion through performing a diverse range of different tasks that have been
enumerated below. These requirements have directed us towards the use of an
analysis system and a virtualized environment to observe new behavior.
1. Behavior discovery. The discovery of observable behavior that occurs during
the execution of the binary; this will allow for new program behavior to be
identified through the multi-execution analysis.
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2. Parallel, sandboxed evaluation. The support of simultaneous exploration
of a program’s EEPs and a protected environment that easily allows for this.
3. Centralized control. The control of the array of virtual machines utilized
by DVasion and the maintenance of a global program state.
4.2.1 Cuckoo Sandbox
We chose to utilize Cuckoo Sandbox 1.2 [3], a malware analysis system, as it
provides two significant contributions towards satisfying the enumerated goals for
the host machine component. First, it allows for the dynamic detection of run-
time behaviors through the use of signatures, written in the form of Python scripts.
These signatures can detect a variety of behaviors, including simple checks for the
establishment of a keylogger to the more complicated execution of a process that
has had code injected into it. This detection is achieved through cuckoomon.dll, a
DLL that is injected into a process that allows for the logging of its behaviors at
runtime, which are then reported back to the main Cuckoo Sandbox process. Given
any modifications to the control flow of a program through DBI, this may be used
to detect any new behaviors found on this path, as they will differentiate based on
what was seen previously in an unmodified execution.
Second, Cuckoo Sandbox natively supports the use of multiple virtual ma-
chines to evaluate programs at the same time. While one may consider this as an
efficient way to process several different binaries at once in a traditional instance
of Cuckoo Sandbox, this framework is essential to DVasion as it can allow multi-
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ple paths to be explored at the same time for the same binary. Given the amount
of paths we would like to explore in an allotted time, we have found this parallel
analysis to be critical in reducing the overall runtime of DVasion.
It is important to note that Cuckoo Sandbox 1.2 has recently become out
of date in favor of version 2.0. To use version 1.2 to the best of our ability, we
integrated several new features, including a variety of new signatures from a fork of
Cuckoo Sandbox 1.2 [38]. Chapter 6 reflects on this design decision and the future
intentions to completely migrate from version 1.2 to 2.0.
4.2.2 KVM
We selected KVM to provide protected, virtualized sandbox environments to
test the suspected malware samples. We found that KVM naturally supports fast
snapshot restores and running multiple instances on the same machine, simultane-
ously. Conveniently, Cuckoo Sandbox natively supports KVM as an environment to
evaluate programs in, so no modifications in that regard were required.
Despite containing malware within this protected environment to avoid any
modifications made to the host computer, it would be ideal to allow the program the
ability to connect to the Internet, as much of a program’s behavior may require a
valid, online connection to be present. As a compromise, we identified INetSim [39],
a software suite that simulates internet services that can be used to trick the malware
into believing that it is free to utilize the computer’s internet connectivity. We found
the virtual machines provided by KVM could easily support this extra consideration.
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Through preliminary testing on a small set of 114 malware samples, we found that
over 30% of them explored more code when INetSim was utilized through observing
the execution’s code coverage; this confirmed the ability of an internet simulator to
further a malware’s execution, and was used during the experimental testing.
Given the use of emulated environments to test malware in prior work, we feel
that is important to reflect on how DVasion may perform if integrated with a system
that uses emulated sandboxes, rather than virtualized ones. Recent anti-emulation
strategies have proven effective in allowing evasive malware to hide certain portions
of its code, including the use of leftover values in registers after a Windows API
call [40]. In this case, the malware utilizes direct branches when comparing register
values, whose outcome may be easily modified through DBI. Through examples like
this, we are confident that the use of emulated environments can allow DVasion to
detect evasive behavior in malware.
4.2.3 Driver
While Cuckoo Sandbox operates well as a stand-alone malware analysis sys-
tem that may process a multitude of binaries through a traditional single-execution
approach, it is clear that a main process, further referred to as the driver, is required
to support the multi-execution method utilized by DVasion. This process, written
in C++, interfaces with Cuckoo Sandbox through its available API, and is aware of
any virtual machines that are available for use. Furthermore, this process will be
responsible for maintaining the global state of DVasion as the algorithm progresses.
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Figure 4.3: DVasion’s algorithm, including interaction with the virtual machines
and Cuckoo Sandbox.
The driver essentially serves as the lead throughout DVasion’s execution; the
virtual machine component acts as the leader’s helper as it processes a certain
task within the virtual machine. To help capture how this process ties together the
fundamentals previously discussed, it’s algorithm steps have been enumerated below
and may be visualized in Figure 4.3.
1. Give two available virtual machines the task to strictly run the binary under
test and identify any EEPs found; there will be no modifications in these runs,
and one of the virtual machines will also perform taint analysis to identify
tainted branches.
2. Receive the EEPs identified in the non-taint task previously issued. The driver
will observe, through what code has been executed, the EEPs that are worth
exploring; static and dynamic analysis schemes can be used to reduce this
effectively, including prioritizing tainted EEPs.
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3. Each EEP that has not been visited is evaluated as a separate task within an
available virtual machine.
4. Evaluate the report generated by Cuckoo Sandbox for each task that involved
binary rewriting to visit an EEP. Accumulate new signatures and print them
at the end along with the corresponding EEP information.
Step 2’s static and dynamic analysis schemes provide a vital way to reduce
DVasion’s overhead in an intelligent manner. Statically, we are able to inspect the
code at the basic block which corresponds to the address of an EEP when it is first
discovered at runtime. Through this, we are able to identify EEPs that will lead
to a “safe” code segment, one that does not execute a malicious action or cause
the program’s execution to go to additional unvisited code. If this is the case, we
conclude that it is not worth investigating this EEP further and discard it. Following
our assumption that maintaining a malware’s program state is not important when
seeking evasive functionality, this strategy is safe.
Despite this static reduction in the EEP count, it may be the case that there
are still too many qualified EEPs to explore; here, we use taint-analysis to only
consider EEPs whose associated branch is based off a tainted value, as described in
Section 4.1.2. While this reduces our abililty to detect new behaviors that utilize
Windows API functions in a way that we did not anticipate, this is an effective
strategy to narrow down the EEPs to candidates that are likely to be hiding evasive
code based on their taint relationship.
Through this mutli-step process, DVasion is able to successfully find new be-
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havior that may be lurking at an EEP.
34
Chapter 5: Experimental Results
In this section, we discuss the results of applying DVasion on both specific
malware families and a large, diverse set of malware. The application of DVasion
to specific case studies confirms that it observes the evasive behavior that has been
documented in prior work, whereas the large dataset analysis shows the extent at
which DVasion can derive new behavior from an array of binaries.
The following tests were run on a machine with two AMD Opteron Proces-
sor 6212 (4 cores per socket, 2 threads per core), with 128 GB of RAM. 32 KVM
instances, with Windows 7 installed, were created and used for parallel EEP evalua-
tion, where each machine was configured to run on a single core with 1 GB of RAM.
To reduce the overhead of restoring from a snapshot, along with the general use of
multiple virtual machines at the same time, these machines were placed in RAM.
All tasks were limited to 45 and 35 seconds for the first and additional executions,
respectively, with the exception of the taint-analysis pass that used 90 seconds to
account for its higher overhead imposed on the binary it was instrumenting. Sever-
ity values accompany each Cuckoo Sandbox signature to indicate, on scale from 1
to 3, how malicious that behavior is. Only a couple of severity values used were
decremented by 1, as we felt it was an appropriate response to how common they
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were found among all programs. Lastly, our current experiments bypass a single
level of evasion within the specific binary that is currently being evaluated; relaxing
this constraint is explored in Section 5.1.1.
Cuckoo Sandbox will provide the mechanism to detect any malicious behav-
iors found when a branch’s alternate path is explored; to ensure that we report on
signatures that were derived solely because of this additional execution, we have
independently run all evaluated binaries through a standard instance of Cuckoo
Sandbox 1.2 that is only augmented through additional signatures used with DVa-
sion. Here, these binaries were given 3 minutes to execute, with at most 8 of the
KVM instances running at the same time to ensure the programs were able to
progress and show any behavior that would have been observed through this tradi-
tional, single-execution approach. This also addresses any concern that the evasive
behavior observed through DVasion is in fact caused by the detected presence of
Pin, and that this behavior would have executed if Pin was not used.
5.1 Specific Malware Case Studies
5.1.1 Dyre
The Dyre Trojan, first spotten in June 2014, has performed a multitude of
attacks across large corporations including Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Bank of
America [41]. This malware exhibits evasive behavior through checking the number
of cores present in a system, as discussed in Section 3.1.
Individually, the virtual machines used for DVasion will fail to detect the
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additional, evasive behavior, given that each KVM instance has been allocated a
single core for testing. However, through the multi-execution analysis performed by
DVasion, we were able discover this behavior along with what it was hiding: finger-
printing of the host environment and the creation of an executable. Though DVasion
targets the exploration of a specific binary through its EEPs, we expanded its ju-
risdiction in this case study to include the spawned executable. Interesting enough,
this binary too contained evasive behavior, specifically additional fingerprinting of
the host environment and the creation of a service called “Google Update Service”.
A summary of these discoveries may be found in Table 5.1, and strongly parallel the
alert issued by US-CERT regarding Dyre’s analyzed behavior [42].
Signature Severity Original DVasion
Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup 3 X X
Collects information to fingerprint the system 3 X
Creates a Windows executable on the filesystem 2 X
Process creates service object(s) (googleupdate) 3 X
Table 5.1: Behavior detected in the original and DVasion analyses of the Dyre




Multiple studies have been performed on the Carbanak APT, which has cre-
ated havoc for banking and finanial institutions worldwide, with estimated losses
totaling upwards of 1 billion USD [43]. The Carbanak malware targets financial
accounts and ATMs, obtaining access through spear phishing emails that led to the
installation of a remote backdoor that allowed for access to infected machines.
As indicated in a Lastline [44] study of the 74 Carbanak samples provided in
the Kaspersky report [43], they found 17% of binaries were found to demonstrate
evasive behavior including the detection of a virtual sandbox or going to sleep. These
results provide a baseline target that DVasion should be able to match, which can
prove the developed system’s effectiveness.
Through the file hashes provided at the end of the Kaspersky report, we were
able to obtain all 74 binaries and applied DVasion to each. The results strongly
parallel the Lastline findings with signatures that encompass the evasive behavior
they cited at a higher detection rate: we found this behavior to exist in over half of
the programs. These results have been summarized Table 5.2 and attest to DVasion’s
ability to discover accurate, evasive behavior.
5.2 Large Malware Dataset Study
Having successfully matched prior analyses performed on evasive malware with
the results obtained through DVasion, we have found confidence in our system’s
ability to identify evasive behavior. Seeking to apply this to a general set of malware,
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Signature Severity Occurrences
Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup 3 35
Creates a Windows executable on the filesystem 2 32
Collects information to fingerprint the system 3 32
A process attempted to delay the analysis task 2 31
Accesses web history 2 29
Likely virus infection of existing system binary 3 25
A process created a hidden window 3 1
Table 5.2: New behavior from the Carbanak dataset.
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we obtained over 32,000 samples from VirusTotal [45], randomly selected 1,000 of
them, and applied DVasion to each. The VirusTotal API allowed us to specify
binaries from 2014 and 2015, as well as those that were a 32-bit executable; these
qualities were verified independently by us.
Through this analysis, we found that 167 of the 1,000 binaries (16.7%) had
new behavior discovered through the multi-execution approach utilized by DVasion;
of these programs with new behavior, 72 (43.1%) of them did not have any signa-
tures detected before. This new behavior consists of 252 instances of new severity-3
signatures detected, and 157 instances of new severity-2 signatures; the specifics
of these new behaviors may be found in Table 5.3. On average, DVasion took 234
seconds to perform its analysis and generate a report, which is a major success given
that such analyses may take on the scale of hours by a human analyst.
We have found two metrics to be especially helpful in collectively understand-
ing the new signatures found. First, one may consider the severity values that
correspond to the signatures in Cuckoo Sandbox. Given the detection of a signa-
ture with a severity value higher than what has previously been seen can be helpful
in understanding the program’s malicious capabilities better. Table 5.4 captures
this metric as it covers all 6 possible largest severity transitions possible, including
not detecting any signatures (highest severity value would be zero) and finding a
signature that either has a severity value of 1, 2 or 3.
Second, the additional behavior found may be captured by the sum of unique
signature severity values; this involves considering two sets: the signatures found
without DVasion, and the signatures found with DVasion. If you were to sum up
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the corresponding severity values of the signatures found in each set and compare
the two, a significant increase could indicate the presence of extensive new behavior.
Of the 167 binaries that had new behavior discovered, their original sum of severity
value was a 4; through DVasion, this value was improved to 10. This indicates
that when DVasion is able to discover new behavior, it typically discovers multiple
number signatures given that signaures usually have a severity value of 2 or 3.
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Signature Severity Occurrences
Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup 3 96
Collects information to fingerprint the system 3 63
Accesses certain keys, possibly to modify browser security settings 2 51
Steals private information from local Internet browsers 3 44
Accesses web history 2 44
Opens keys used to modify proxy settings 2 19
Creates a Windows executable on the filesystem 2 17
Accesses keys, possibly to collect information about installed applications 2 15
Checks the version of Bios, possibly for anti-virtualization 3 12
Detects the presence of Wine emulator via function name 3 11
Detects Sandboxie through the presence of a library 3 11
A process created a hidden window 2 8
Likely virus infection of existing system binary 3 7
Executed a process and injected code into it, probably while unpacking 3 2
Starts servers listening on a specific port 2 2
Installs an hook procedure to monitor for mouse events 3 1
Detects virtualization software with SCSI Disk Identifier trick 3 1
A process attempted to delay the analysis task 2 1
Harvests information related to installed mail clients 3 1
Queries information on disks, possibly for anti-virtualization 3 1
Attempts to remove evidence of file being downloaded from the Internet 3 1
Checks for the presence of known devices from debuggers and forensic tools 3 1
Network anomalies occurred during the analysis 2 1









Table 5.4: Malware that showed an increase in its highest signature severity value.
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Chapter 6: Future Work
Our system confirms that program state does not need to be maintained to
expose additional, new behavior through a multiple-execution analysis of program
binaries. An unintended consequence of such a decision includes the vulnerability
to unintentional (e.g. due to inconsistent program state) or intentional (e.g. divide
by zero after an anticipated rewrite) program crashes that may prevent the analysis
system from observing additional behavior in a program. Initially, one may consider
the incorporation of methodologies that maintain program state, but such systems
are imperfect for a variety of reasons, as cited in the related work within Section
2.4.2. Future work can extend our policy of not maintaining state, and simply ignore
program crashes.
Our system utilizes Cuckoo Sandbox 1.2, which was the current version during
DVasion’s development. Since then, this has been rendered out-of-date with ver-
sion 2.0. While additional features were integrated to our current setup of Cuckoo
Sandbox, not all new features could be easily ported back to 1.2. We anticipate
on updating the Cuckoo Sandbox instance used with DVasion to 2.0 soon, which
should usher in a variety of new features and previously incompatible signatures to
detect additional evasive behaviors within the binaries.
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While the VirusTotal dataset utilized for our experimental results has proven
to yield a diverse range in malware samples from different families, these samples
lack the ability to expose DVasion to real, zero-day attacks. Even though such
samples are comparatively difficult to obtain, we plan on obtaining such program
binaries through the integration with a honeypot. Furthermore, this test will confirm
DVasion’s ability to handle the thoroughput of testing all binaries that are captured
from this real system.
Similar to previous multiple-execution analysis systems, we share the limita-
tion that indirect branches are not considered as a source of evasive entry points,
which may potentially restrict our ability to view a more complete picture of the
binary. Unfortunately, this class of branches can be used evasively, for example,
through the use of a system’s clipboard count obtained by the the Windows API
CountClipboardFormats to create a multitude of locations the control flow of a
program may follow [46]; this evasion exploits the intuition that a real system will
likely have contents copied to the system’s clipboard, whereas a sandbox is likely
absent of such evidence of human interaction. Indirect branches are notably more
complex to analyze the direct branches given that they may cause a program’s con-
trol flow to travel to more than two possible locations; for direct branches, we only
had to consider the fallthrough and target addresses as potentially EEPs. Our fu-
ture work envisions the incorporation of features like jump tables, when present,
which may allow for all possible outcomes from an indirect branch to be discovered
and considered as EEPs.
Most recently, we have investigated ways to lower DVasion’s overhead through
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using a lighter test environment known as a container. DVasion uses a dedicated
virtual machine instance for each EEP that is explored in its multiple execution
analysis, which essentially translates to multiple Windows 7 instances running si-
multaneously. Containers seek to isolate processes in user-space, which we believe
could be a way to allow multiple EEPs to be visited in parallel within the same
virtual machine. We hope that the integration of such a testing environment can
allow for more EEPs to be evaluated at the same time.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
In this paper, we have described DVasion, an effective tool in uncovering hid-
den behavior within evasive malware. Through a multi-execution approach, our
solution is able to explore additional code segments that previously would not have
been executed in a traditional, single-execution system. This expansion in code exe-
cution directly translates to the possibility of uncovering previously unseen behavior,
which is detected through the behavioral monitoring component of Cuckoo Sand-
box. In order to modify the program at run-time to reach these additional branch
outcomes, dynamic binary instrumentation provided through Intel Pin proved to be
essential. The overhead of such a system was heavily considered throughout its de-
velopment; helpful static and dynamic methods, including dynamic taint tracking,
proved to be an effective manner in reducing the additional code that needed to be
explored.
The results achieved through DVasion strongly indicate that it successful in
discovering hidden, malicious behavior in malware. Through strong parallels in
DVasion’s results with existing work on evasive malware, we are able to gain a
significant amount of confidence in the accuracy and potential such a system has
dealing with this variant of malicious binaries. Through an application of our system
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to a dataset of 1,000 malware instances, we found 167 contained hidden behavior.
This success validates our design decision to not maintain program state, given that
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